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based around the use of maritime forces and the avoidance of major military
commitments on the continent of Europe, has been the cause of one of the
more enduring debates within the history of British defence policy. The
debate has been a lively one that, in many respects, has revealed as much
about the predilections of the various commentators as it has shed light on
the past. Critics on both sides of the argument have not been averse to using
and abusing the historical record for their own purposes. One of the
reasons for this is that the debate is not just of academic interest. Arguments
over the ‘British way in warfare’ have often been marshalled in support of a
particular national strategy and, by extension, in favour of devoting greater
or lesser resources to different military capabilities. To cut a complex story
rather short, if one believes in the ‘British way’ then this suggests a focus on
maritime capabilities whereas if one believes the alternative view, in the
necessity and efficacy of a major military commitment to Europe, then the
army and associated tactical air forces deserve a greater share. Such debates,
always lively, take on a particular significance when resources are scarce and
governments need to make hard decisions over priorities.
Hew Strachan wrote about these issues in the aftermath of the conten-
tious 1981 defence review, discussions about which were often articulated
in the terms of a ‘traditional’ British maritime strategy versus a continental
commitment. He noted the manner in which historical writings underlay
contemporary debates and also how modern arguments were reflected back
when interpreting the past. Strachan identified the rather polemical nature
of much of the commentary, including that by some of the most respected
military historians of the time.
 
1
 
 In this context it is worth remembering Sir
Michael Howard’s warning that history does not teach lessons, historians
do, and that the agenda of historians is set by current controversies, whether
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they wish it or not. His suggestion that historians ‘are as prone as anyone
else unconsciously to formulate conclusions on the basis of temperament,
prejudice and habit and then collect the evidence to justify them’ is certainly
borne out by an examination of many of the contributions to this debate,
including, perhaps, his own.
 
2
 
In many respects the terms within which this debate has been articulated
have their origins with the work of Sir Julian Corbett. In contrast to Rear
Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, who tended to emphasise the activity of navies at
sea and whose main works pay relatively little attention to joint operations,
Corbett viewed naval operations in a wider context of a maritime strategy
combining all elements of national power. He viewed joint military and
naval operations as the normal expression of the British method of waging
war. Corbett believed that Britain, with its security assured through
command of the sea, had historically been able to achieve success in war
through the exploitation of a combination of blockade, economic support
to allies, the seizure of its enemy’s overseas territory and the application of
limited military power at some point, or points, away from the main enemy
force. Britain could thereby exploit maritime power to gain the maximum
benefit from limited military resources at a fraction of the cost of a major
campaign on the continent. Corbett recognised that the Navy could not
achieve this alone. His belief in the requirement for a joint approach to
national strategy is reflected in his most famous work, published in 1911, in
which he made it clear that: 
Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues
between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest
cases – either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory
and national life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it possible for
your army to do.
 
3
 
Corbett’s ideas have been criticised, particularly for the faith that he appears
to place in the ability of a maritime strategy to allow Britain to make unlim-
ited gains at limited cost in unlimited wars.
 
4
 
 Perhaps the most obvious
criticism of the approach is that it required Britain to find a continental ally
willing to shoulder the main burden of a war while the British remained
detached. The historical record suggests that when such allies were not avail-
able, as in 1805 or 1940, Britain’s strategic position was extremely perilous.
Nevertheless, Corbett’s historical method was rigorous and professional and
he articulated his ideas in a measured fashion. The main thrust of his work,
as has been noted already, was to suggest that maritime and land forces
needed to act in concert and that Britain’s traditional maritime strategy was
not an alternative to, but rather an extension of, continental strategies.
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Basil Liddell Hart was less measured in his approach. Liddell Hart
picked up and developed Corbett’s ideas and those of other contemporary
maritime strategists such as Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. He articulated
the value of the British way in warfare in a strident manner, most famously
in a 1932 publication with that title.
 
5
 
 To Liddell Hart the mobility and
surprise provided by maritime power could be used in support of an indi-
rect strategy whereby continental opponents could be blockaded, their trade
could be destroyed, their colonies conquered and their coastline harassed
by raids and diversions without a major commitment of British manpower
to the main theatre of operations. He was highly critical of British policy
during World War I for slavishly following continental practices and
deploying millions of men to fight in the mud of Flanders from whence all
too many did not return. Michael Howard has described his analysis as
nothing more than ‘a piece of brilliant political pamphleteering, sharply
argued, selectively illustrated, and concerned rather to influence British
public opinion and government policy than to illuminate the complexities
of the past in a serious or scholarly way’.
 
6
 
 In this Liddell Hart had some
success in the interwar period, although Britain still deployed its expedi-
tionary force to France in 1939 and planned to fight once more alongside its
major continental ally, until those plans were shattered, along with the
French Army, in the German offensive of 1940.
 
The ‘British Way’ Abandoned?
 
One can portray the remainder of Britain’s war within the terms of the
‘British Way’, as did Captain Stephen Roskill in the official history of the
Royal Navy in that war.
 
7
 
 However, post-war British planners quickly came
to realise that a major military commitment to Europe was vital if Europe,
with American assistance, was to build a credible counter to the Soviet
Union and its allies. British participation in the treaties of Dunkirk (1947)
and Brussels (1948) helped to lay the basis for the establishment of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 by demonstrating to
the United States that Europe was willing to contribute to its own defence.
Participation in NATO did not imply a specific formal commitment of
British troops to Europe. This commitment came with the Paris agreement
of October 1954 where Britain agreed to maintain four divisions and a tacti-
cal air force to Europe until 1994. This was the first time in 250 years that
the British had accepted a commitment to maintain a major military force
in Europe in peacetime. As David French notes, it is somewhat ironic that
the actual force level had more to do with reassuring one ally, France, about
the rearmament of another, West Germany, than with the actual military
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threat from the Soviet Union.
 
8
 
 Equally ironic was the fact that, just as
Britain accepted this commitment, British defence planners were begin-
ning to recognise that there was little real prospect of fighting a conven-
tional war in Europe.
From the time of the 1952 Global Strategy Paper, the British Chiefs of
Staff had begun to emphasise the importance of nuclear weapons in
deterring a Soviet attack and in reducing the chances of sustained conven-
tional combat in Europe. By 1955, less than a year after the Paris agree-
ment, the Chiefs were arguing that a major war was unlikely to break out
and that, if it did, it would be characterised by an early and intense
nuclear exchange. At the same time, however, Britain needed to be able to
maintain its position in the Cold War and to meet limited aggression
beyond Europe.
 
9
 
 In such circumstances the main priority was to maintain
the nuclear deterrent, after that priority should be given to dealing with
commitments and contingencies beyond Europe and the lowest priority
could be given to forces designed actually to fight a major war against the
Soviets.
A focus on continental priorities, allied to the perilous condition of the
post-war British economy, had meant that relatively little priority was given
to the type of mobile and flexible military forces that might be useful in
meeting unforeseen contingencies overseas. The inability of the military to
provide useable options within an appropriate timescale doomed plans to
use force in response to the Abadan crisis in 1951 and doomed the actual
use of force during the Suez crisis five years later.
 
10
 
 The debacle at Suez
reinforced an impetus that already existed to change the emphasis within
defence policy and this was manifest in the 1957 Defence Review that
declared an end to reliance on large static conventional forces, ending
conscription and announcing a reduction in the British Army of the Rhine
(BAOR) from 77,000 to 64,000 troops. Nuclear weapons were to deter war
in Europe and improvements in strategic mobility would be used to meet
limited contingencies further afield.
 
11
 
The Royal Navy had anticipated such changes and, even prior to the
Suez crisis, it had drawn up a new concept for the future navy that envis-
aged a reduction in the emphasis on major war contingencies in Europe and
a refocus on limited war tasks. At the heart of this was a new concept for a
task group, based at Singapore, built around an aircraft carrier, a helicopter-
equipped commando carrier capable of landing and supporting a Royal
Marine Commando unit, a cruiser and four destroyers.
 
12
 
 This emphasis on
flexible limited war contingencies was codified in the famous ‘autumn
naval rethink’ of 1958 and remained at the heart of naval policy and national
strategy for the next ten years.
 
13
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Maritime power projection capabilities had been rather neglected in the
post-war decade. The Navy’s impressive wartime fleet of six fleet carriers,
six small light fleet carriers and 40 escort carriers with 1,336 front-line
aircraft was quickly reduced and ambitious plans to construct large 46,900-
ton vessels were abandoned.
 
14
 
 Manpower shortages and the problems of
operating a new generation of aircraft from older, unmodified carriers
meant that the Royal Navy’s operational carrier force in the late 1940s
usually consisted of a small number of widely dispersed light fleet carriers
carrying a limited number of low performance aircraft.
 
15
 
 The Navy’s
carriers retained a potential for power projection that was demonstrated in
operations during the Korean War and later during the Suez crisis but it
would take a shift in priorities for this to be their main rationale rather than
air defence and anti-submarine warfare.
The Navy did seek to maintain and update its aircraft carriers, with
mixed success. It proved far less concerned about maintaining amphibious
capabilities. In World War II the British had played the leading part in
developing the ships, craft, doctrine and techniques that made possible the
successful landings in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France from 1942 to
1944. By 1945 the British possessed an enormous amphibious fleet and
Combined Operations, the organisation with responsibility for amphibious
warfare, had grown into something akin to a fourth service with a major
headquarters in Whitehall, a large training organisation and representation
for the Chief of Combined Operations on the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
A jealous Admiralty had wrested back control of the landing craft from
Combined Operations Headquarters in 1943. One can understand their
reasons for doing so. By 1944 there were over 60,000 officers and men of
the Royal Navy and Royal Marines employed in manning landing ships and
craft.
 
16
 
 By the time of the formal Japanese surrender Britain possessed an
amphibious armada that consisted of more than 5,000 ships, craft and
landing barges.
 
17
 
Official policy was that all three services would retain their expertise in
amphibious warfare. This called for the retention of the Combined Oper-
ations organisation and for a massive training establishment supported by
a large amphibious fleet that could be used both for training and as a
nucleus upon which to expand in wartime. Unfortunately, post-war strin-
gency, allied to an overall lack of priority, particularly from a navy anxious
to avoid diverting resources to something that was seen as a low priority,
meant that these plans went unfulfilled. Initial plans for a peacetime lift
sufficient for a division were pared down to brigade group lift, then a
battalion group lift although such debates were somewhat academic as
very few amphibious ships were actually maintained in service. It was 1951
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before an Amphibious Warfare Squadron could be created, based in the
Mediterranean. It was designed to cater for battalion lift but was
frequently below strength. Equipped with ships of World War II vintage it
provided a rather old-fashioned type of capability, slow, relatively short-
legged and somewhat constrained in its beaching characteristics. Behind
this small force was a large number of ships held in reserve ready to be
mobilised if need be, given sufficient time to reactivate them. That this
was not a quick reaction force was demonstrated by the long lead time
before the military were in a position to respond to the nationalisation of
the Suez Canal in July 1956.
One of the reasons for the low priority accorded to amphibious forces
was that it was recognised that, while major amphibious operations might
become necessary in the later stages of any future conflict, they would not
be possible in the early stage of any war. As such, one needed to develop new
doctrine and prototype equipment, but it was not necessary to maintain a
large operational force in peacetime. The requirement was limited to the
minimum required for training and development and also a capability to
conduct small-scale amphibious raids akin to the commando raids under-
taken during World War II.
 
18
 
 The latter, at least, might provide a useful way
of striking against an enemy occupied coastline. Post-war policy was based
upon the conclusions of the 1944 Bottomley Committee (also known as the
RAW Committee). That committee focused on maintaining the skills
required to conduct large-scale operations on the model of the European
landings of 1943–44 and explicitly ruled out the requirement to maintain
specialist amphibious forces in peacetime in order to meet unforeseen
contingencies overseas.
 
19
 
 A limited amount of training and development was
possible but, overall, capabilities atrophied. Even the Royal Marines, who
retained a commando raiding role, were able to devote relatively little time
to amphibious warfare.
 
The ‘British Way’ Redefined?
 
In his post-war work Liddell Hart retained his faith in the mobility and flex-
ibility provided by British sea power. In 1960, in his book 
 
Deterrent or
Defence
 
, he argued that in World War II the diversionary effect of allied
amphibious forces meant that the Germans were never able to mass their
full strength against the Soviets and that this played a key part in eventual
Allied success.
 
20
 
 He stressed that the threat posed was often of greater
import than the actual effect that could be created by the small forces avail-
able before American strength had been mobilised but, as the Germans
could not know where this small force might be employed, they were
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driven to disperse significant forces over a very wide area. Liddell Hart was
basically restating the argument in favour of the British way, arguing that: 
It was through sea power and its ‘companion’ – the power to carry by
sea a force that can be thrown ashore wherever desired or needed –
that for centuries Britain helped her friends on the Continent to resist
aggression, and averted its domination by any single nation or tyrant.
The same coupled power also enabled this small island country of
very limited strength to maintain a world-wide network of colonies
and protectorates. In the Second World War this coupled power,
immensely reinforced when the United States came into the war
alongside Britain, was basically the decisive factor in liberating Europe
from Hitler’s tyranny, as well as in liberating the Far East from
Japan’s. For air power then had not the range to exert its effect until
bases were gained within close enough reach of the enemy for it to
operate effectively, while Russia’s land power was not enough by
itself to overthrow him.
 
21
 
Most of Liddell Hart’s work provides an excellent example of how contem-
porary debates impact upon historical analysis and he is far from alone in
the world of strategic analysis for allowing the former to dominate the latter.
However, by 1960 the terms within which the debate was being held had
changed and Liddell Hart recognised this. Nuclear stalemate in Europe made
a major continental war unlikely at the same time that Cold War rivalry
increased the possibility of limited conflicts overseas. He argued that ‘sea
power and its amphibious companion’ provided the most effective deterrent
of and counter to limited aggression beyond Europe, preferable to airborne
options due to its superior reach, reduced dependence on overseas bases and
over-flight agreements and both the cost and tactical vulnerability of the air
option. His argument directly supported the Navy in its new-found enthu-
siasm for amphibious sea power. Indeed, his conclusion, given below, could
have been lifted straight from an Admiralty policy paper of the period: 
An amphibious force of modern type, operating from the sea and
equipped with helicopters, is free from dependence on airfields,
beaches, ports, land-bases, with all their logistical and political
complications. The use of an airborne force, or of any land-based
force, is a more irrevocable step, since its commitment is more defi-
nite and its withdrawal more difficult. A self-contained and sea-based
amphibious force, of which the US Marine Corps is the prototype, is
the best kind of fire-extinguisher because of the flexibility, reliability,
simplicity, and relative economy.
 
22
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Liddell Hart’s emphasis on the US Marine Corps was indicative of his
penchant for specialist and elite forces. He reflected on the rather equivocal
record of success that the British had enjoyed in amphibious operations in
the twentieth century thus far and compared it unfavourably, some might
say unfairly, with that of the Americans in the Pacific campaign of 1941–45.
His conclusion was that the difference could be explained by the fact that
the British had not had a dedicated elite force devoted to amphibious oper-
ations, whereas the Americans had in the form of the US Marine Corps.
His argument did not reflect on the various complex reasons why the Royal
Marines had never filled a role analogous to the US Marines, and this was
hardly uncharacteristic of his approach to history.
Liddell Hart was not the only advocate of the British way to support the
Navy’s new emphasis on expeditionary operations. Stephen Roskill articu-
lated a case in support of amphibious task groups supported by aircraft
carriers and a balanced naval force in 
 
The Strategy of Sea Power
 
, published in
1962, that was clearly based on contemporary Admiralty plans.
 
23
 
 By this
time the Navy had already converted two redundant light fleet carriers into
helicopter-equipped ‘commando carriers’ and was pursuing a construction
programme that would, within the next five years, see the obsolescent ships
of the Amphibious Warfare Squadron replaced by two new assault ships,
HMS 
 
Fearless
 
 and 
 
Intrepid
 
, and by six new Logistic Landing Ships. The
previous year the Admiralty had put forward a plan to deploy military
power east of Suez from a Joint Services Seaborne Force with two amphib-
ious groups, each built around two commando carriers and two assault
ships and capable of landing and supporting in operations a balanced
brigade group. Each group would have two aircraft carriers attached,
providing a powerful air defence and strike capability, plus associated escort
and support vessels. Once the requirement to cater for rotation and replace-
ment vessels was accounted for this ‘double stance’, as it was known, would
have required four commando carriers and four assault ships, double what
was eventually deployed, and six aircraft carriers, albeit only with four air
groups.
 
24
 
Unsurprisingly the key Chiefs of Staff study, 
 
British Strategy in the Sixties
 
,
ruled out the ‘Double Stance’ on the grounds of cost but did approve the
concept of a single Amphibious Group requiring the deployment of all four
major amphibious ships east of Suez. Aircraft carrier strength was limited
to one, and later two such vessels maintained in commission in theatre.
 
25
 
The 1962 Defence White Paper articulated the logic behind the Navy’s
position, arguing that: ‘We must insure against the loss of fixed installations
overseas by keeping men and heavy equipment afloat, and by increasing the
air and sea portability of the Strategic Reserve.’
 
26
 
 As Britain withdrew from
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empire it progressively relinquished most of the static bases and garrisons
that had previously been the cornerstone of its presence beyond Europe.
Political limitations on the use of such bases as remained, apparent during
the Suez crisis and subsequently, allied to limitations on the over-flight of
other states’ territory by military aircraft, made the mobility and flexibility
provided by maritime forces particularly valuable. Maritime forces could
provide access to trouble spots without the need to negotiate basing or over-
flight. They could do so unobtrusively and with as much or as little fanfare
as desired. In many respects maritime forces could exploit precisely those
characteristics of mobility and flexibility that had enabled the British way in
warfare, as articulated by Corbett in reference to major conflict, to offer
valuable military and political solutions in minor conflicts.
The Admiralty’s approach to projecting British power overseas was built
around amphibious forces and aircraft carriers but the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Sir Caspar John, was at pains to emphasise its joint credentials. He
stressed that the Navy was not trying to ‘go it alone’.
 
27
 
 Indeed, the Navy was
so keen to involve the Army in this amphibious strategy that it agreed to
limit the number of active Royal Marine Commando units so as not to
alienate the War Office, somewhat to the chagrin of the Commandant
General, Royal Marines.
 
28
 
 The Navy was also willing to recognise that its
approach did not rule out a requirement for land-based aviation, both in a
transport and a strike role.
Just as Corbett saw maritime strategy within the context of a wider
national strategy complementing any continental endeavours, the Navy in
the 1960s saw its approach as complementing that of the other services. The
Army would continue to provide ground forces whose impact would be
dramatically enhanced by the mobility and support that could be provided
by maritime forces. The Royal Air Force (RAF) would continue to provide
both strategic and tactical air movements and to offer strike and air defence
options when within range of the reduced number of bases that could be
expected to be available in future. Maritime, land and air forces would act
in concert. In operational terms this was a key strength of the approach.
In political terms it proved to be a fatal weakness. It was expensive,
particularly as the Navy now sought to gain approval for a new generation
of aircraft carriers. The RAF showed fewer scruples in advancing a rather
less joint vision, based around the application of long range airpower using
aircraft that had not yet been purchased from bases that did not yet exist.
There was no place for aircraft carriers in their approach. The RAF lost the
argument and in 1963 the Navy gained Cabinet approval for construction
of CVA-01, the first of what they hoped would be two new large aircraft
carriers.
 
29
 
 Land-based aviation simply could not provide the kind of robust,
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balanced intervention capability provided by the Joint Services Seaborne
Force.
The renewed emphasis that was being placed on joint operations and
expeditionary forces caused the development of a new concept of opera-
tions described as the seaborne/airborne/land concept or, more frequently,
simply as the seaborne/airborne concept. This was developed by Amphibi-
ous Warfare Headquarters (AWHQ)
 
30
 
 and the Joint Services Amphibious
Warfare Centre at Poole, Dorset, in consultation with the School of Land/
Air Warfare at Old Sarum, Wiltshire, and was based on the idea that the air
and maritime aspects of expeditionary operations needed to be considered
together. Unsurprisingly the concept was overtly joint, emphasising that
the only way to maintain an adequate balance and level of force was for air-
transported and amphibious forces to operate as part of an integrated team.
The concept was designed to cater for rapid intervention by mobile forces
in a highly politicised environment and with a reduced reliance on fixed
bases. It recognised that a small balanced force that could be made available
quickly was of more use than larger forces that were difficult to deploy
within an acceptable timescale. For military force to be useful it had to be
useable.
 
31
 
The new concept was matched by institutional change. AWHQ and the
Land/Air Warfare Committee were replaced by a new Joint Warfare
Committee, supported by a Joint Warfare Staff, and a Joint Warfare Estab-
lishment was formed to replace the separate Joint Services Amphibious
Warfare Centre and the School of Land/Air Warfare.
 
32
 
In 1962 the Joint Warfare Staff explained the rationale for the seaborne/
airborne concept in the following way: 
In the present concept of limited war our forces must be ready to
counter sudden enemy intervention in a country that is neutral or
friendly to us. The enemy will have the initiative and will be able to
strike at the time and place he chooses. Even if his moves can be fore-
seen, our forces may not be able to land before his active intervention,
for political reasons. The requirement is for a force that can act
quickly and is ready to fight immediately in an area that may be far
from its base; and that has the fighting power and mobility to take
offensive action and get quick results to prevent the war from extend-
ing or from escalating to global war.
The concept envisaged ‘amphibious and air transported troops landing at
short notice and operating as a single team, each providing the forces best
suited to its means’.
 
33
 
 The principles outlined in the concept were incorpo-
rated into a new, multi-volume 
 
Manual of Joint Warfare
 
, the first edition of
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which was issued in February 1964. The Manual covered all aspects of joint
operations in non-nuclear warfare beyond Europe and was replaced by a
second and third edition in 1967 and 1970. By 1970 the Manual no longer
focused on non-European contingencies, instead it included all aspects of
joint warfare.
 
34
 
 In this respect it reflected the shift within British defence
policy towards a refocus on European contingencies and on the continental
commitment.
That refocus on Europe was a result of two main factors. Under its
new concept of Flexible Response NATO had begun to re-emphasise the
requirement to bolster conventional forces on the continent in order to
provide more flexible options in the event of a war against the Soviet
Union. At the same time Britain’s Labour Government faced a pressing
need to control defence expenditure and, from 1966, began a reduction
in Britain’s ambitions and forces beyond the NATO region. Thus, CVA-
01 was cancelled in 1966, not so much because of the strength of the
alternative RAF case as due to the fact that British requirements had
changed. Britain would no longer need the kind of robust intervention
capability that the Joint Services Seaborne Force had sought to offer. In a
series of defence reviews between 1966 and 1975 the British progres-
sively reduced the scale and scope of their forces and commitments
beyond Europe until, by 1975, they maintained only minimal forces
outside the NATO area. That logic was carried further by the 1981
Defence Review that sought to reduce further those remaining elements
of national (principally naval) power that did not focus on the major
threat, that of war in continental Europe. It seemed that even in its new
form the British way in warfare had fallen victim, once again, to the
continental commitment.
 
The Return of the ‘British Way’?
 
The Royal Navy was never entirely reconciled to a role that focused exclu-
sively on protecting the Atlantic sea routes and it was assisted in its mainte-
nance of balanced capabilities by the experience of the 1982 Falklands
conflict, where the remnants of the expeditionary force of the 1960s proved
vital to British success. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and
the subsequent accession of many former Soviet allies into NATO
removed the threat of major war on the continent in the short and medium
term. The military rationale for BAOR, in so far as it had ever really existed,
was now gone. As the 2003 European Union Security Strategy statement
made clear, ‘Large scale aggression against any member states is now
improbable’.
 
35
 
 Whatever the political, administrative or financial advantages
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of basing forces in Europe may be, the military case for a British ‘continen-
tal commitment’ has disappeared, at least for the time being.
Of course, this does not bring an end to the debate. The relative balance
that should be maintained between maritime, air and land capabilities and
the degree to which these should be land or sea based, deployed home or
away, will continue to generate dispute and controversy. It is even possible
that such debates promote a creative dialogue that supports efficient
defence decision-making, although the history of defence policy since 1945
would seem to suggest the opposite.
The Royal Navy in the twenty-first century has chosen to articulate its
case in a fashion that bears a close similarity to that of the 1960s. The policy-
makers of the late 1950s and early 1960s would recognise much that has
been written in support of the current ‘Future Navy’ once they had learned
to decipher contemporary doctrinal jargon and to strip away some of the
outrages that contemporary doctrine writers perpetrate against the English
language.
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 Indeed, if one compares the basic rationale behind the seaborne/
airborne concept and the solutions that it sought to provide one can find
many similarities with the Navy’s contemporary notion of Littoral
Manoeuvre.
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 This, of course, is not surprising. Both are based on the
opportunities presented by the flexibility and manoeuvrability of maritime
forces. They are based on enduring features of maritime power and strategy
that were articulated so ably by Corbett one hundred years ago. In this sense
the ‘British Way in Warfare’ is still alive, it is just that in the twenty-first
 
t
 
century it relates to the ability of maritime forces to contribute to a joint
strategy to enable flexible military operations beyond Europe. I suspect that
both Corbett and Liddell Hart would approve.
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